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The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can affect the effective-
ness of monetary policy potentially in two ways. First, it limits the size
of a change in the policy interest rate when trying to loosen money. For
example, when the nominal rate is 0.5 percent, it obviously cannot be cut
by more than 0.5 percent. Second, it may alter the mechanism of how a
movement of the policy rate drives market rates of longer maturities. This
paper is an attempt to investigate the latter issue, and, in particular, to
empirically examine the effect of monetary policy on the term structure
of interest rates when nominal short-term rates are close to zero, using
Japanese data in the 1990s and early 2000s.
We found that when the policy short rate is already zero but longer
rates are still positive in the zero interest rate period, an expansionary
monetary policy still works through the conventional interest rate channel
by pushing down longer rates, although the effect is much weakened rela-
tivetothenormaltime.Whenthelongerratesarealreadyloweredtosome
level, however (for example, the 10-year bond rate went down to the level
as low as 1.5 percent during the quantitative easing period of 2001–06),
a further expansion of the monetary base by increasing excess reserves of
banks appears to have little effect in lowering longer-term rates.
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Nominal interest rates usually cannot go below the ﬂoor of zero and can get stuck at
zero or in its vicinity, even though the real interest rate may still be higher than the level
necessary to ensure stable prices and full employment. The question of how monetary
policy should be conducted in a zero interest rate environment has been attracting a
great deal of attention recently among economists as well as policymakers.
1
Such a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can affect the effectiveness of
monetary policy potentially in two ways. First, it limits the size of a change in the
policy interest rate when trying to loosen money. For example, when the nominal rate
is 0.5 percent, it obviously cannot be cut by more than 0.5 percent. Second, it may
alter the mechanism of how a movement of the policy rate drives market rates of longer
maturities. This paper is an attempt to investigate the latter issue and, in particular, to
empirically examine the effect of monetary policy on the term structure of interest rates
when nominal short-term rates are close to zero, using Japanese data in the 1990s and
early 2000s.
2
How interest rates with a variety of maturities move in response to monetary policy
is important for several reasons. First, central banks conduct monetary policy by manip-
ulating the short-term rates, but it is mainly the long-term rates that affect consumption
and investment decisions of economic agents. Therefore, examining the transmission
of a policy shock to medium to long rates is of primary importance (Summers [1991]).
Second, when the short-term rate becomes too low to function as a policy instru-
ment, interest rates on bonds with longer maturities can serve as a measure of policy
impact. Estimating the relation between short rates and long rates would be helpful in
making a quantitative assessment of the degree to which monetary policy would lose
its effectiveness due to the zero bound constraint on the policy rate. Further, it would
provide a useful insight into thinking on how the central bank can potentially affect
long-term rates when lowering the short-term policy rate is no longer feasible.
Third, the level of the long-term rate is often said to contain information about the
market expectation of future inﬂation (Mishkin [1990]). If we can extract the informa-
tion about the people’s inﬂation expectation from the current long-term interest rate,
we can ﬁnd out how successful the monetary policy of the central bank is in raising the
inﬂation expectation.
To investigate in what way a monetary policy can move longer-term rates by con-
trolling the short-term policy rate, Evans and Marshall (1998) construct a linear vector
autoregression (VAR) system with a block of macroeconomic state variables together
with long-term interest rates. Evans and Marshall (2007) extend the same framework
to one with shocks identiﬁed in an innovative way. In contrast, our empirical approach
is based on a nonlinear VAR model with a censored dependent variable. The original
1. The issue of how the zero lower bound constraints may interfere with the conduct of monetary policy is dis-
cussed by Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Clouse et al. (2000), Reifschneider and
Williams (2000), Wolman (1998), and others. The issue of what monetary policy can do when the economy
is in the liquidity trap is discussed by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004),
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999), Eggertsson (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004), Krugman (1998),
McCallum (2000, 2001), Svensson (2001), and others.
2. Related work includes Braun and Shioji (2006), Ichiue and Ueno (2006), and Nagayasu (2004).
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VAR on which our model is based is the one similar to Evans and Marshall (1998,
2007), but unlike in their model, the zero lower bound constraint on the short-term rate
is binding during some time period. This makes our VAR model nonlinear and leads to
nonstandard dynamic responses of key variables to a monetary policy shock, which are
the main focus of our paper.
Recently some macroeconomists have begun using models with no arbitrage re-
strictions.
3 When the zero bound constraint is binding, however, such models would
lose many desirable properties. Specifying stochastic discount factors as a linear func-
tion of factors with the zero bound constraint would not lead to the bond yields that
are linear in factors and do not even have closed-form expressions. Our main focus
is on examining the implications of the zero bound constraint on the monetary policy
effect regarding impacts on longer-term rates. To do so, we keep the basic framework
unchanged without imposing the no-arbitrage condition. After directly examining the
dynamic responses of our nonlinear VAR model, we next investigate the monetary
policy impact on long-term rates through the expectations hypothesis (EH) when the
policy rate is essentially zero. From the standpoint of monetary policy, the EH of the
term structure of interest rates is attractive, because it directly links long-term rates
to short-term rates. This gives further insight into evaluating the policy impact on the
expected future short rates.
4 Roush (2007) shows that the conditional version of the EH
is still useful for investigating the monetary policy effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data used for
our analysis. Section III discusses our model. Section IV presents the empirical results,
and Section V concludes.
II. Data and Background
A. Data
In this paper, we use monthly data from 1990 to 2007. The variables include the Japa-
nese consumer price index (CPI), the index of industrial production (IP), the interbank
overnight call rate (CAL), the monetary base (MB), and yields on the Japanese gov-
ernment bonds (JGBs) with maturities of 1, 5, 10, and 20 years. Figure 1 displays the
output growth, the overnight call rate, inﬂation, and the monetary base in Japan during
the 1990s and early 2000s. Figure 2 displays interest rates ranging from short-term to
long-term zero-coupon bonds. Data on the call rate and the monetary base are obtained
from the Bank of Japan (BOJ) database. Data on industrial production and the CPI
are extracted from the International Financial Statistics database of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The yields on JGBs are obtained from the Bloomberg database.
3. They explain the latent factors used in the bond pricing models in terms of macroeconomic shocks. Ang and
Piazzesi (2003) developed a VAR model describing the joint dynamics of bond yields and macroeconomic
variables with no arbitrage restrictions. Rudebusch and Wu (2004) developed a similar term structure model
with state variables linked to a simple New Keynesian macro model.
4. Althoughthere isabundant empiricalevidence againstthe EH, theconventionalview ofthe transmission channel
of monetary policy rests on the hypothesis that variation in current long rates is driven by variation in current
and expected movements of the policy-controlled short rate. According to Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), empirical
rejectionsoftheEHreﬂectincorrectassumptionsaboutexpectationsformationratherthanincorrectassumptions
about the theoretical link between long rates and short rates.
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Although the dramatic rise in asset prices starting in the late 1980s had caused the BOJ
to focus its policy activities on asset prices, after the bursting of the asset price bubble
in 1990, the main concern of the BOJ was to deal with deﬂation and to revive Japan’s
domestic economic activity. Therefore, there does not seem to be any major structural
change in the BOJ’s policy goal during our sample period.
5
Before introducing our model in detail in the next section, we brieﬂy describe the
monetary policy practice of the BOJ during the 1990s, a period when the BOJ explicitly
used a short-term nominal interest rate (the overnight interbank call rate) as the policy
instrument.
6 Since the collapse of the speculative asset price bubble in early 1990, Japan
has suffered prolonged deﬂation and economic stagnancy. In response to this economic
downturn together with the appreciation of the yen, the BOJ aggressively lowered nom-
inal interest rates. The overnight call rate declined from a peak of 8.2 percent in March
1991to2.0percentinMarch1995(Figure1).BySeptember1995,itwasloweredbelow
50 basis points and had remained at that low level during the time range of our dataset.
Morespeciﬁcally,duringtheperiodfrom1995to2000,theBOJadoptedwhatitcalleda
5. The policy goal has not changed, but there are changes in the policy instruments during our sample period, as
described later in this paper.
6. Ito and Mishkin (2004) provide an excellent summary of Japanese monetary policy in the 1990s. See also Hetzel
(1999), Miyao (2002), Ahearne et al. (2002), and Oda and Okina (2001).
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Figure 2 Japan Term Structure
zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). The goal of this policy was to avoid further intensifying
deﬂationary pressures and stop the economic downturn. The BOJ’s ﬁrm commitment
to the ZIRP is reﬂected in the often-cited statement by Governor Masaru Hayami at a
press conference on April 13, 1999: “We [the BOJ] will continue the zero interest rate
policy until we reach a situation where deﬂationary concerns are dispelled.” In short,
the policy undertaken by the BOJ in the late 1990s was to move nominal interest rates
down to a level as low as possible by satiating the money market with an excess supply
of funds. One important aspect of the ZIRP was that an exogenous monetary easing
does not result in any further movement in the interest rate when the rate is already on
the zero lower bound. Therefore, while the stance of monetary policy can be directly
measured by the interest rate when it is positive, the interest rate at zero is no longer an
adequate indicator of the policy stance.
In March 2001, the BOJ adopted the quantitative easing policy (QEP) by switching
its instrument from the overnight call rate to the monetary base.
7 The QEP ended in
March 2006, when the BOJ returned to the use of the call rate as its instrument. During
7. More accurately, the BOJ used bank reserves (the current account balance in their use of the word) as its policy
instrument during the QEP period. The monetary base is simply the sum of bank reserves and the currency in
circulation. When changes in the former dominate those in the latter in a given period, the monetary base and
bank reserves should both work as a policy indicator. Since bank reserves had rarely been used independently as
an operating target before the QEP period, it is found empirically more convenient to work with the monetary
base rather than bank reserves.
63the QEP period, the BOJ’s policy goal did not appear to change, it only switched the
instrument to the monetary base, which could be observed even after the nominal rate
hit the zero bound.
B. The Interest Rate as a Censored Variable
To model the behavior of the monetary authority in Japan described above, we make
the following speciﬁcation. Let
￿




a latent variable measuring the true stance of monetary policy.
￿
￿
￿ is in general not
observable by an econometrician. However, as long as the central bank uses the short-
term interest rate as the operating target,
￿
￿
￿ is directly linked to
￿

















￿ is a lower bound on the nominal interest rate at which
￿
￿ is regarded as
essentially zero.
The BOJ set the uncollateralized overnight call rate guideline at 0.50 percent for
1995–98 and at 0.25 percent after September 1998. Between February 1999 and July
2000, this lower bound was further pushed down to about 0.02–0.03 percent. Although
the actual rate went down to the level as low as 0.01 percent from 2001 to 2005, we re-
gard the rate as being censored, as long as the actual rate
￿
￿ is less than 50 basis points.
8
Accordingly, throughout this paper, we choose the lower bound
￿ to be 0.50 percent,
and use the terms such as “zero interest rate” or “zero lower bound” even when the
actual lower bound is not necessarily exactly equal to zero.
Equation (1) treats
￿
￿ as a censored variable.
9 It implies that, when used by the
monetary authority as the policy instrument, the short-term interest rate provides a
direct measure of the stance of monetary policy. However, if the monetary policy drives
the interest rate down to zero, a further monetary easing will not affect the interest
rate. The latent rate
￿
￿
￿ can be thought of as the level of the interest rate the monetary
authority would have set according to its policy rule if there were no zero lower bound
on the interest rate. Figure 3 displays the estimated
￿
￿
￿ along with the actual rate
￿
￿.
C. Three Regimes in Monetary Policy
To connect the above scheme to the macroeconomic shocks, consider a standard money
market model. When the interest rate is the operating target, we can describe the de-
termination of the interest rate and the monetary base in terms of fundamental macro-
economic shocks by the following (we abstract from all the lagged variables that may





































8. A visual examination of the plot of the call rate in Figure 1 gives support for such a speciﬁcation. Moreover, it is
also supported by Krugman (1998), which argues that at a nominal rate of 0.43 percent “the economy is clearly
in a very good approximation to liquidity trap conditions.”
9. The censored model as in (1) was ﬁrst proposed by Tobin (1958) in the regression context and is applied to the
case of the zero bound on interest rates by Wolman (1998), Iwata and Wu (2006), and others.
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Figure 3 Observed Call Rate and Latent Rate
Note: The solid line indicates the observed call rate, and the dotted line indicates the latent
rate estimated using our model.
where MB
￿ is the monetary base at time
￿. Note that the short-term interest rate
￿
￿
is determined jointly by (1) and (2a). We use the monetary base here instead of bank
reserves, which are a direct operating target of the BOJ under the QEP regime, for two
reasons. First, the monetary base appears to be a more appropriate measure of the quan-
tity side of the money market. Second, the monetary base is simply the sum of (1) bank
reserves and (2) banknotes and coins in circulation, and the two usually co-move.




￿ is a vector of innovations to the macroeconomic variables to which the cen-
tral bank responds contemporaneously when setting the short-term interest rate.
 MS
￿
is an exogenous monetary policy shock due to any discretionary actions that are not
captured by the systematic monetary policy rule, and
 MD
￿ in equation (2b) stands for
an exogenous money demand shock. When the interest rate is the policy instrument,
the monetary authority fully accommodates money demand shocks so that
 MD
￿ only
affects the monetary base without having any immediate effect on the interest rate. On
the other hand, the exogenous monetary policy shock
 MS
￿ affects both the interest rate
and the monetary base.
More speciﬁcally, equations (1) and (2) together imply that, when the interest rate




￿) lowers the interest rate and raises
the monetary base. When the interest rate is initially on the zero bound, however, an




￿) does not generate any movement in the interest
rate, but leads to an increase in the monetary base. In other words, when the interest
rate is positive, both the interest rate and the monetary base contain information about
65monetary policy actions in either direction. But under the ZIRP regime, exogenous
monetary expansions can only be reﬂected in the corresponding movements of the
monetary base, while the interest rate remains on its lower bound.
10 When the central
bank switches the operating target from the short-term rate to the monetary base, two





































Under the QEP regime, (3b) represents the monetary policy reaction function where
the money demand shock
 MD
￿ is fully accommodated. On the other hand, the short rate
reﬂects the money demand shock as well as the policy shock.
In summary, there are three regimes in monetary policy conducted by the BOJ dur-
ing our sample period. They are (1) the positive interest rate (PIR) regime, (2) the ZIRP
regime, and (3) the QEP regime. The short rate is positive under the PIR regime, while
it is essentially zero under the ZIRP regime and the QEP regime. The operating target
of monetary policy is the overnight call rate under the PIR and ZIRP regimes, while
it is the monetary base (more rigorously, bank reserves or the BOJ’s current account
balance) under the QEP regime. The difference between the ZIRP regime and the QEP
regime lies only in their operating targets that were used, and both regimes share the
common policy goal. Our ZIRP regime is deﬁned as the period when the call rate is
below 50 basis points. Hence, it covers the period of the BOJ’s ZIRP but also includes
some period before that policy (1995 to 1999) as well as the period after the QEP was
lifted (several months in 2007).
D. Implications of Zero Bound on Term Structure
Under the EH, the yield on the













































￿ is the term premium, which is assumed to be time invariant. We call the ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side of equation (4) the EH component of the
￿-period bond




￿ . Ruge-Marcia (2006) derives explicit expressions of the EH
component of long-term rates when shocks are distributed according to a multivariate
normal distribution.
The implications of the zero bound on the long-term rate (4) are as follows: ﬁrst,
the long-term nominal rate cannot be expressed as a linear function of the conditional
means of future short rates. It becomes nonlinear. Second, the response of the long-term
rate to a change in the short-term rate becomes smaller as the short-term rate is close to
zero. Third, the response becomes asymmetric in terms of the sign of the shock.
10. The maintained assumption is that there is no structural change in the policy rule during the whole sample
period. This allows us to address the central issue of how the monetary policy effects are altered when the
interest rate reaches its lower bound but the central bank continues to follow the same policy rule. Although
the BOJ switched its operating target from a short-term rate to the monetary base under the QEP regime, we
do not regard it as a structural change in the policy rule.
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In the following empirical analysis, we do not impose the EH explicitly except
when wedrawthe entireyield curvein the lastpart of our analysis.Our VARsystemlets
the long-term rates react freely to monetary policy shocks. As in Evans and Marshall
(1998, 2007), the no-arbitrage condition is not imposed either, so the responses are not
estimated in a fully efﬁcient manner. But they provide consistent estimates. If the EH
holds, our estimates should coincide with the results of Ruge-Marcia (2006). If the no-
arbitrage condition is imposed but the zero bound is ignored as in Ang and Piazzesi
(2003), the VAR results would not provide consistent estimates in this case.
III. Econometric Framework
A. Model
Our system consists of three groups of variables. The ﬁrst group includes standard
macroeconomic variables such as industrial output (
￿), and CPI (
￿). Monetary pol-
icy is assumed to respond to these variables contemporaneously. The second group
is money market variables including a short-term nominal interest rate (the interbank
overnight call rate,
￿) and the monetary base at the BOJ (MB). These variables contain
information about the stance of monetary policy. The last group includes interest rates
on bonds with various maturities (
￿
￿). These are the variables that are of central inter-
est in this paper and play an important role, particularly when the nominal interest rate
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￿ is a vector


































￿ indicate the exogenous money supply and demand shocks, respectively. We
assume that the variables in
￿
￿ span the state space for the system, which implies
the zero restrictions in (4a). The interest rate
￿
￿
￿ is determined by the state variables




￿, which correspond to the latent factor used















￿ has a zero mean vector
and a variance-covariance matrix equal to an identity matrix. It is important to note
that in equation (4)
￿
￿





￿ on the right-hand side of the equation includes the actual interest rate
￿
￿, which is related to
￿
￿
￿ in a nonlinear way. This speciﬁc feature yields a model that
exhibits interesting dynamics.













































￿ stands for a vector








is a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix. The equations (5) and (4b) consist of a block
recursive system. We estimate the reduced-form (5) common under the three regimes.
B. Identiﬁcation
We impose the following restrictions to identify the model. First, we assume that the
exogenous money market shocks
 
￿
￿ do not affect output and price level (
￿
￿
￿)i nt h e
same period, which is a quite standard identiﬁcation restriction in the literature (e.g.,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999]), especially when monthly data are used.
Second, it is assumed that the money demand shock to the short-term rate is accom-
modated when setting the policy rate at a target level under the PIR and ZIRP regimes,
while the money demand shock to the monetary baseis absorbed under the QEP regime.
These assumptions lead to C
￿ A
￿






































































under the QEP regime, where “0” indicates zero restriction and “
￿” indicates a




￿ to a monetary policy shock
 MS
￿ .
When the economy is in a liquidity trap with zero interest rates, money demand is
likely to behave quite differently than in the normal environment with positive interest
rates. We therefore allow for the possibility that when the nominal interest rate is zero,






￿ as well as
 
￿
￿ . We also allow
for different intercept term for MB in model (5) when the zero bound is approached.
IV. Empirical Results
In Figure 3, we plot the estimated latent rate
￿
￿
￿ over the entire sample period (January
1990 through October 2007) to see the BOJ’s policy stance in terms of the short rate.
We can observe that the BOJ acted quite aggressively in monetary expansion, especially
during the period 2004–06.
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Figure 4 Dynamic Responses to Expansionary Monetary Shocks
[1] Output
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
[2] Inﬂation Rate
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
[3] Short Rate
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
[4] Monetary Base
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
Note: The solid line in each diagram is the response curve, and the two dotted lines are the
one-standard-error conﬁdence bands.
Figure 4 displays the dynamic responses of output, price, the short-term in-
terest rate, and the monetary base to an expansionary monetary policy shock un-
der the three policy regimes.
11 To calculate the size of the responses, we estimate
11. A monetary shock is deﬁned here as a one-standard-error shock to
￿MS
￿ , which affects the interest rate equation























































by averaging the generated data under each regime based on the estimated VAR model
as in Iwata and Wu (2006); see also Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Potter (2000).
The results show that the policy shock pushes down the short-term rate under the PIR
regime, but the rate does not move at all under the ZIRP as well as the QEP regime (see
Figure 4 [3]) due to the zero bound constraint. When the interest rate is positive, the
level of output rises signiﬁcantly after the negative interest rate shock, exhibiting the
typical humped-shape responses (Figure 4 [1], the ﬁrst column) and inﬂation declines
slightly (Figure 4 [2], the ﬁrst column). When the interest rate already hits the zero
bound, however, a further monetary expansion does not help increase output much
under the ZIRP regime (Figure 4 [1], the second column), but appears to do so slightly
under the QEP regime (Figure 4 [1], the third column).
12

















































































































































￿ for each regime
￿
￿ PIR,
ZIRP, and QEP, separately.
Figure 5 displays the results for 1-, 5-, 10-, and 20-year JGBs under each of the
three policy regimes. First, when the interest rate is positive, we observe that a cut in
the policy interest rate leads to a strong, signiﬁcant fall in the 1-year bond yield after
the shock from six months to a full year (Figure 5 [1], the ﬁrst column). Around one
and a half years after the shock, the impact disappears. The response of the 5-year bond
is slightly weaker and disappears after two years (Figure 5 [2], the ﬁrst column). This
pattern repeats with bonds of longer maturities. There are only little effects on 10-year
and 20-year bonds (Figures 5 [3] and 5 [4], the ﬁrst column).
Under the ZIRP regime, the policy impact on the bond yields get slightly weaker
than that under the PIR regime, but still exhibits a similar pattern of diminishing inﬂu-
ences (Figures 5 [1]–[4], the second column). Under the QEP regime, however, there
appears to be almost no impact observed (Figure 5 [1], the third column).
In summary, consistent with the pattern reported in Iwata and Wu (2006), the
reaction of output and inﬂation to an expansionary monetary shock is similar under
the PIR regime and under the ZIRP regime, although the impact of reaction is much
weakened when the zero bound is reached. The above patterns of output and inﬂation
reactions in the ﬁrst and second columns of Figure 4 are consistent with the reactions
12. This statement refers to the fact that the error bands do not contain the zero value so that the output reaction
under the QEP regime is deﬁnitely positive. However, because the sizes of the shocks under the ﬁrst two
regimes and the QEP regime are not directly comparable, we cannot say whether the magnitude of output
reaction to the monetary shock under the QEP regime is larger or smaller than that under the ZIRP regime.
70 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2010Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates When Short-Term Rates Are Close to Zero
Figure 5 Dynamic Responses of Medium- to Long-Term Rates
[1] 1-Year Bond
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
[2] 5-Year Bond
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
[3] 10-Year Bond
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
[4] 20-Year Bond
PIR regime ZIRP regime QEP regime
Note: The solid line in each diagram is the response curve, and the two dotted lines are the
one-standard-error conﬁdence bands.
of medium- to long-term rates exhibited in the same columns of Figure 5. A monetary
policy is linked to the output level through the interest rate channel. When the policy
interest rate hits the zero bound, it cannot be lowered from the ﬂoor of zero, which
constrains the effectiveness of monetary policy. Even when the policy rate hits the
71zero bound, the long-term rates are still positive and a further action to increase the
monetary base could push down those rates. We do not know what level is exactly the
lower bound for the long-term rate, but as long as the long-term rate is still above its
ﬂoor, an expansionary monetary policy through the interest rate channel should work
even after the short-term policy rate hits its own bound and can no longer function as
a policy indicator.
Our results under the PIR and ZIRP regimes are consistent with the above view.
After the call rate was lowered to 0.5 percent in 1995, the 10-year bond rate fell to
2.8 percent (Figure 2). The call rate stayed at around the same level for the following
three years, while the 10-year rate continued to fall to a level as low as 1.5 percent in
1998. This is what some economists call the policy duration effect of the ZIRP (Fujiki
and Shiratsuka [2002], Ueda [2005], and Oda and Ueda [2005]). In fact, there was
a continuous monetary expansion during this period as is observed in the latent rate
movements in Figure 3 or directly in the behavior of the monetary base in Figure 1.
In contrast, the policy shock by increasing the base money during the QEP period
does not have any visible impact on medium- to long-term bond rates, as can be seen
in the third column of Figure 5. Actually, the plots in Figure 2 suggest that the 10-year
bond rate looks a little lower during the QEP period of 2001–06 than the period before
2001 and after 2006. However, this difference appears too small compared to the sheer
size of the monetary expansion undertaken during this period by the BOJ, as observed
in Figure 3. If the exogenous expansionary shock to the base money does not generate a
decline in long-term rates during the QEP period, however, what led the output increase
observed in the third column of Figure 4 [1]? This can be interpreted as monetary policy
working through a non-interest-rate channel, as is often argued by some monetarists
(e.g., Meltzer [1995]). But a better way might be to view it in a more time-speciﬁc
context. During the 2001–06 period, a massive injection of liquidity by the BOJ ﬁnally
started to improve the credit market environment, which lifted the economy slightly.
Figure 6 shows the estimated impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock on
the entire yield curve in each of three cases. It is constructed by taking a difference
between the two predicted short rates, one with a policy shock and the other without
a shock, given the historical level of all variables in a speciﬁc time point as the initial
value, and then calculating long rates based on the EH given in (4). When the interest
rate is positive (as in January 1997), the negative interest rate shock makes the yield
curve steeper in a signiﬁcant magnitude as we normally expect (Figure 6 [1]). When
the short rate hits the zero bound, only the short end of the yield curve is affected by an
expansionary monetary policy shock (Figure 6 [2]). The yield curve becomes steeper,
but only weakly. When the central bank abandons the short rate as a policy instrument
and attempts to directly increase the monetary base as in June 2001, there is no longer
any visible impact on the yield curve, which remains unchanged (Figure 6 [3]). Since
the long-term rate is positive even during the QEP period, according to expectations
theory the future short rate is expected to be positive, and so is the future inﬂation rate.
Our exercise above shows, however, that there is no additional increase in the inﬂation
expectation due to a further expansion of the monetary base during the QEP period.
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Figure 6 Effects of an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock on Yield Curves
[1] PIR Regime
January 1997
[2] ZIRP Regime [3] QEP Regime
June 1998 June 2001
Note: The effect in each case is calculated by taking a difference of the two predicted EH
components given in equation (4), one with a policy shock and the other without a
shock, given the historical data in a speciﬁc time point as the initial condition.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigated how the zerointerest rateenvironments alterthe mechanism of a
movement of the policy rate driving market rates of longer maturities, and in particular,
empiricallyexaminedtheeffectofmonetarypolicyonthetermstructureofinterestrates
when nominal short-term rates were close to zero, using Japanese data in the 1990s and
early 2000s.
We found that when the policy short rate is already close to zero but longer rates
are still positive in the zero interest rate period, an expansionary monetary policy still
works through the conventional interest rate channel by pushing down longer rates,
73although the effect is much weakened relative to the normal time. When the longer
rates are already lowered to some level, however (for example, the 10-year bond rate
went down to the level as low as 1.5 percent during the QEP period of 2001–06), a
further expansion of the monetary base by increasing excess reserves of banks appears
to have little effect in lowering longer-term rates.
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